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ABSTRACT
This study investigates how short-term debt and debt capacity
help firms to make efficient financing decisions and reduce under-
investment problem. The sample includes Chinese nonfinancial
firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over
the period 2007 to 2017. The findings indicate that short-term
debt is positively related to leverage. The results also indicate that
growth positively influences leverage. The results further show
that short-term debt enhances the positive impact of growth on
leverage. These findings reveal that short-term debt makes firms
financially flexible, and allows them to obtain more cost-effective
debt by repricing and renegotiation of debt contracts in the pres-
ence of valuable growth opportunities. Furthermore, the results
illustrate that debt capacity is positively associated with leverage,
suggesting that debt capacity helps firms to have an easy access
to the credit market and reduce liquidity risk. Overall, the findings
remain consistent across different types of firms (state-owned
[S.O.E.] and non-state-owned enterprises [N.S.O.E.]) and by consid-
ering alternative proxy of growth.
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The agency conflicts of creditors–shareholders have attained huge consideration in the
literature. The conflict of interest between creditors and shareholders leads managers to
act in the interest of shareholders, and make different choices of debt to equity ratios
and maturities of debt to mitigate the risk associated with debt. Firms with risky debt
may face a debt overhang problem in the presence of shareholders–creditors conflicts.
Risky debt may not allow highly levered firms to invest in new investment projects,
even if projects have positive N.P.V.s, which results in underinvestment problem.
The relation of financing–investment decisions is considerably discussed in the
literature. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that in perfect capital markets, a firm’s
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financing and investment decisions are not interdependent, and capital structure is
irrelevant. However, theoretical and empirical research examined how various market
imperfections can make financing and investment decisions interrelated. Myers
(1977) suggests that in highly levered firms with high-growth opportunities, managers
may give up some investment projects having positive N.P.V.s to protect share-
holders’ interest, which results in underinvestment problems. Therefore, the conflicts
of interest between shareholders and creditors over the execution of investment
opportunities will create potential underinvestment problems.
Myers (1977) argues that if debt matures before growth options are executed, a
firm’s incentive to deviate from a value-maximizing exercise policy is eliminated.
Moreover, Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005) suggest that short-term debt can mitigate
both under- and over-investment problems by making debt less sensitive to changes
in firm value and by allowing for more frequent repricing of debt. Diamond (1991)
argues that short-term debt exposes firms to a liquidity risk. Further, Childs et al.
(2005) argue that although short-term debt can mitigate incentives to under- or over-
invest in growth options, this benefit must be balanced against the greater liquidity
risk of refunding short-term debt. However, Lemmon and Zender (2010) argue that
firms which are not constrained by concerns over debt capacity have more stable
returns, and thereby have higher ratings. Such firms, with their lower roll-over risk
(Diamond, 1991, 1993) and greater financial flexibility (Denis & McKeon, 2012), can
shorten their debt maturity to reduce the underinvestment problem without reducing
leverage (Johnson, 2003). The preceding discussion raises an empirical question
that how short-term debt and debt capacity can help firms to reduce underinvestment
problems.
Several studies examined corporate financing or investment decisions in isolation
(Barclay & Smith, 1995; Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1987; Kaplan & Zingales,
1997; Khan, Qin, & Jebran, 2019; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). For example, Aivazian,
Ge, and Qiu (2005) document that leverage has a statistically significant and negative
association with investment, which is in line with the overinvestment hypothesis.
Although these studies investigate the impact of financing decisions on investment,
some studies show how growth opportunities impact corporate financing decisions.
Johnson (2003) and Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) investigate the impact of growth
on the joint choice of debt maturity and leverage. They show that firms having high
growth opportunities rely on more short-term debt or low leverage to alleviate under-
investment problems. Moreover, short-term debt can help firms to reduce under-
investment problem sufficiently, and thus eliminates the negative impact of growth
on leverage (Johnson, 2003).
Dang (2011) examined the impact of financing decisions on investment in U.K.
listed firms in a dynamic framework and provides empirical evidence that using debt
maturity and leverage as strategic complements does not help U.K. firms to reduce
debt overhang problems sufficiently. Some studies in the Chinese context support the
link among choice of debt, growth and financial constraints. For example, Coad and
Srhoj (2019) suggest that firms with higher short-term liabilities have a higher prob-
ability to become high growth firms. Lemmon and Zender (2019) elaborated that
debt structure choice balances ex ante adverse selection against ex post moral hazards.
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Moreover, Howell (2018) suggests that in response to fuel economy standards requir-
ing firms to upgrade technology or sacrifice quality, firms with joint ventures reduced
quality and price relative to their counterparts, and Howell (2019) reports that pri-
vately owned firms maintain a higher innovation performance compared with state-
owned firms. However, prior studies have rarely investigated the possible factors,
which can affect the interaction among debt choice, growth, and leverage. Making
future capital structure adjustment overtime under static debt policy is very costly for
firms. The costs that arise from investment deviations lead firms to reduce leverage
and have no impact on debt maturity. The corporations always prefer long-term debt,
although short-term debt can help them to reduce agency cost. Because the benefit to
reduce agency costs is offset by the costs of liquidity risk related to short-term debt.
Dynamic debt policy gives firms financial flexibility and makes them capable of
adjusting debt level over time. Thus, usually, short-term debt is considered optimal to
mitigate sub-optimal investment decisions by repricing and renegotiating debt con-
tracts. Debt capacity helps firms in reduction of liquidity risk associated with short-
term debt, which allows firms to reduce leverage by reducing short-term debt in bad
state (when firm value is low) and increase leverage by increasing short-term debt in
good state (when firm value is high). Debt capacity helps firms to increase the debt
level in the availability of valuable growth opportunities. Moreover, Lemmon and
Zender (2010) suggest that higher debt capacity lead firms to higher credit ratings,
and those firms also have stable returns. Such firms, with their lower liquidity risk
and greater debt capacity, can use more short-term debt to decrease underinvestment
problem without reducing leverage (Denis & McKeon, 2012; Diamond, 1991, 1993;
Johnson, 2003).
In China, the major proportion of debt, that firms acquire are provided by finan-
cial institutions in the form of loans, because bond markets and capital markets in
China are not very well established compared to developed countries. So, they pro-
vide limited financial support to the corporations (Cai, Fairchild, & Guney, 2008).
Western economies rely more on long-term debt, as the mean value of debt maturity
of OCED firms is approximately 0.57 (Dang, 2011). Comparatively, Chinese firms
rely less on long-term debt (Cai et al., 2008; Jiang, Jiang, & Kim, 2017). Moreover,
Chinese legal environment, banking system, institutional structure, and corporate
governance are based on modern socialization model and are considered different
from developed economies (Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Fan, Lau, & Young, 2007;
Gul, 1999; Lam & Du, 2004; Jebran, Chen, & Tauni, 2019).
Based on the preceding discussion, this study fills the gap in literature by investi-
gating how short-term debt and debt capacity help Chinese firms to alleviate the
underinvestment problem. Furthermore, investigating the agency cost theory in the
Chinese context can provide interesting results, because Chinese firms have unique
characteristics, which are different from firms in developed economies. Therefore,
this study comprehensively investigates the interactions among debt capacity, short-
term debt, growth, and leverage in a unified and dynamic framework.
The study adds several contributions to the literature. First, the study investigates
the relationship between short-term debt and leverage, and findings suggest that
short-term debt is positively related to leverage. So, the study reports and establishes
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the positive relationship between short-term debt and leverage. Second, this study
examines whether short-term debt can enhance the positive impact of growth on
leverage. The results illustrate that short-term debt enhances the positive impact of
growth on leverage. The findings support the argument that short-term debt paves
the way for gradual and continuous renegotiation process, which gives firms’ oppor-
tunity to make flexible financing decisions. Third, this study investigates the relation-
ship between debt capacity and leverage. The results indicate that debt capacity is
positively related to leverage, which reveals that debt capacity help firms to have easy
access to credit market and reduce liquidity risk. Finally, this study investigates
whether short-term debt and debt capacity can help firms for alleviating underinvest-
ment problems. The findings of the study elaborate that growth is found to have a
positive effect on leverage, which suggests that debt capacity and short-term debt
help firms to reduce underinvestment problem sufficiently.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section two includes the literature
review and hypotheses. Section three discusses research methodology. Section four
reports and discusses the results. Finally, section five provides conclusions.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
The agency cost model discusses potential interaction among short-term debt, growth,
and leverage (Myers, 1977). It is argued in the principal-agent model that as a conse-
quence of agency conflict among shareholders, creditors, and managers (agents of
shareholders), firms may give up projects with positive N.P.V.s due to underinvest-
ment problem. The debt overhang risk associated with outstanding debt can be allevi-
ated by reducing leverage or by using short-term debt. Interaction among leverage,
short-term debt, and growth are affected by two conditions: (1) using more short-
term debt to control debt overhang problem; and (2) liquidity risk associated with
short-term debt.
Short-term debt can alleviate creditors–shareholders conflicts over the execution of
growth opportunities. Myers (1977) suggests that expiry of short-term debt before the
execution of new investment project eliminates a firm’s incentive to deviate from its
policy of value-maximizing. Moreover, Childs et al. (2005) argue that short-term debt
allows firms to make frequent repricing of debt contracts, thereby, reduce both
underinvestment and overinvestment problems. Chinese firms rely on a big propor-
tion of short-term debt (Jiang et al., 2017; Mirza, Jebran, Yan, & Iqbal, 2017). Larger
proportion of short-term debt makes firms financially flexible, and financial flexibility
allows firms to increase leverage in good state (when firm value is high) by increasing
short-term debt, it also helps firms to reduce leverage in bad state (when firm value
is low) by reducing short-term debt. Therefore, we expect that short-term debt has a
positive effect on leverage, and develops the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Short-term debt is positively associated with leverage
Using of short-term debt that expires before the execution of a new investment
project enables shareholders to get full advantage of new projects by renegotiating
debt contracts. Myers (1977) and Johnson (2003) suggest that short-term debt can
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alleviate underinvestment problems, and sufficient reduction of such problems can
eliminate the negative impact of growth on leverage.
Firms facing underinvestment problems may not be able to exploit available
growth opportunities. Some empirical studies support the negative link of growth-
leverage. For instance, some studies report that growth and leverage are negatively
related (Homaifar, Zietz, & Benkato, 1994; Ozkan, 2001; Rajan & Zingales, 1995).
Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) investigate the nature of relationship between
growth opportunities and leverage by using extensive data, and document that growth
opportunities affect leverage negatively.
Previous studies provide evidence in support of a negative association between
growth and leverage for developed economies, where firms rely largely on long-term
debt. For example, Dang (2011) argues that when valuable growth opportunities are
available, financially flexible firms may issue more short-term debt to finance growth
opportunities. Hence, the total leverage will increase, which results in a positive asso-
ciation between growth and leverage. We expect that relying more on short-term
debt gives firms financial flexibility, which enables them to issue more debt in the
presence of growth opportunities. Therefore, we develop the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Growth is positively associated with leverage
Debt capacity refers to the borrowing ability of a firm, and it reflects the capability
of a company to pay back borrowed money within a specified period. Financially
constrained firms may receive funds from government, which encourage them to
invest in valuable growth opportunities. Because access to government funds increases
the capacity to borrow funds, Howell (2017) suggests that government support have
positive effect on finance, revenue, and survival of financially constrained younger
firms. Further, Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Van Reenen (2019) report that sub-
sidies from the government to small firms increase manufacturing employment. In
addition, Lemmon and Zender (2010) suggest that higher debt capacity leads firms to
higher credit ratings, and those types of firms also have stable returns. Such firms,
with their greater debt capacity and lower liquidity risk, can rely on short-term debt
to decrease the underinvestment problems without reducing leverage (Denis &
McKeon, 2012; Diamond, 1991, 1993; Johnson, 2003). In contrast, firms who have
debt capacity constraints are less able to gain access to debt market due to low credit
rating (Lemmon & Zender, 2010).
Based on the preceding discussion, we expect that debt capacity helps firms to
have easy access to the credit market, obtain more debt, and hence debt capacity
increases leverage. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Debt capacity is positively associated with leverage
Short-term debt can alleviate stockholder–creditor problems over exploiting valu-
able growth opportunities. Childs et al. (2005) argue that short-term debt can reduce
underinvestment problems by allowing firms for more frequent repricing of debt.
Diamond (1991) discusses that liquidity risk is associated with short-term debt if
creditors deny agreeing for refinancing. Due to liquidity risks, those firms, having
valuable growth opportunities, can use short-term debt. Childs et al. (2005) discuss
that even though short-term debt can alleviate debt overhang problems, but this
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benefit must be balanced against the cost of liquidity risk. The study further suggests
that the use of short-term debt helps firms to issue more debt when valuable growth
opportunities are available.
Based on the preceding discussion, we conclude that short-term debt can help
firms to enhance the positive impact of growth on leverage. Hence, we hypothe-
size that:
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Short-term debt enhances the positive impact of growth on leverage.
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample and data
The sample includes nonfinancial firms listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock
exchange over the period 2007 to 2017. The adoption of new accounting standards in
2005 and initiation of non-tradable shares reform in 2006 are the main reasons to
restrict our sample from 2007 to 2017. Data is extracted from the China Stock
Market and Accounting Research Database (C.S.M.A.R.). In the data filtration pro-
cess, we exclude B share listed firms, missing values, quarterly and monthly data. We
only consider annual observations of A-share nonfinancial listed firms. After filtra-
tion, the final dataset is comprised of 2,774 firms consisting 18,677 observations.
3.2. Methodology
The difference (DIFF GMM) and system (SYS GMM) generalized method of moments
at the second stage are used in the study to overcome biases. GMM dynamic models
take the first difference of all the variables of a dynamic equation and being robust to
heteroscedasticity and cross-correlation. It overcomes all non-linear restrictions
(Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998). GMM has been used in many pre-
vious studies (Brown & Petersen, 2009; Guariglia, 2008; Guariglia, Liu, & Song,
2011). The following are the econometric equations for estimation purpose:
Leverage equations
LEVi, t ¼ a0þdlevLEVi, t1 þ a1SDEBTi, t þ a2GTHi, t þ a3DCAPi, t þ xlevði, tÞbLEV þ ui, t ,
(1)
LEVi, t ¼ a0þdlevLEVi, t1 þ a1SDEBTi, t þ a2GTHi, t þ a3DCAPi, t
þ a4SDEBT  GTH þ xlevði, tÞbLEV þ ui, t ,
(2)
where LEVi,t represents leverage, LEVi,t-1 represents lagged value of leverage, SDEBT
represents short-term debt, GTH represents growth opportunity and DCAP represents
debt capacity, SDEBTGTH represents the interaction term of short-term debt and
growth, xlevi, t includes control variables for leverage equation, ui,t represents error term.
Description of variables is given in Table 1.
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3.3. Measurement of variables
Leverage is defined as obligations that corporates need to pay back. Following previ-
ous studies (Fan, Huang, & Zhu, 2013; Xiao & Li, 2016; Yang, Han, Li, Yin, & Tian,
2017), we measure leverage (LEV) as total liabilities scaled by total assets. Short-term
debt can be defined as the debt having a maturity period of less than one year, we
measure short-term debt (SDEBT) as short-term debt over total liabilities. Growth
can be defined as growth opportunities. Following previous studies (Coles, Daniel, &
Naveen, 2006; Su, 2010), we use Tobinq as a proxy of growth (GTH) and measure it
as market value over book value of assets. Following Yang et al. (2017), we use sales
growth as an alternative proxy of growth. Debt capacity can be defined as the bor-
rowing ability of a firm. Following Tse and Rodgers (2011), we measure debt capacity
as fixed assets scaled by the sum of long term debt and equity.
3.4. Control variables
The trade-off theory suggests an association between the tax rate and leverage, and
elaborate that firms’ takes advantage of tax shield by using leverage (DeAngelo &
DeAngelo, 2007; Fama & French, 2002). Following previous studies (Cai et al., 2008;
Kane, Marcus, & McDonald, 1985), we control for effective tax rate (EFTR), and we
measure it as tax expense over earnings before interest and tax.
Pecking order theory supports a negative leverage-profitability association (Myers,
1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984), contrary view supports a positive leverage-profitability
relation (Jensen, 1986; Modigliani & Miller, 1963). We control for profitability and
following Yu and Ashton (2015), we measure it as earnings before interest and taxes
over total assets.
Bigger firms face low transaction and bankruptcy costs and possibly use more
leverage, thus, indicating a positive size-leverage nexus (Frank & Goyal, 2003, 2009).
We use the natural log of total assets to control for firm size (Fosu, Danso, Ahmad,
& Coffie, 2016; Gilson, 1997; Qian & Yeung, 2015).
We also control for corporate governance variables that include board size, dual
leadership, and board independence. Studies support a positive link between leverage
and board size (Wang, 2012). Further, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that to
reduce managerial discretional cash flow, leverage may be used as an alternative
Table 1. Description of variables.
Symbol Variable Description
LEV Leverage Total liabilities / total assets
SDEBT Short-term debt Short-term debt / total liabilities
GTH Tobinq Market value/ Book value of assets
SGTH Sales Growth Growth rate of operating income
DCAP Debt Capacity [Fixed assets / (Long-term debtþ equity)]
EFTR Effective Tax Rate Tax expense / EBIT
TA Total Assets Natural log of total assets
ROA Return on Assets EBIT/total assets
BSIZE Board Size Total number of members of the board
CEODUA Dual Leadership 1 if the chairman of the board is holding both positions
i.e., chairman of the board and CEO, otherwise 0
INDBOARD Independent Directors Ratio of independent board members to total members of the board
Source: Authors formation.
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governance mechanism. We calculate board size as total number of members of the
corporate board. We measure dual leadership by using a dummy variable, and we
assign 1 if the C.E.O. is also board chair, otherwise 0. We measure board independ-
ence by the ratio of independent directors to total directors.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Results
4.1.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. The mean value of the leverage (LEV) is 0.492.
The mean value of short-term debt (SDEBT) is 0.26. The mean value of growth
(GTH) and alternative proxy of growth (SGTH) are 1.99 and 0.204, respectively. The
mean value of debt capacity (DCAP) is 0.463. The mean values of effective tax rate
(EFTR), natural log of total assets (TA), and return on assets (ROA) are 0.174, 22.14,
and 0.044, respectively. The mean values of board size (BSIZE), dual leadership
(CEODUA), and board independence (INDBOARD) are 8.91, 0.213, and 0.37,
respectively.
4.1.2. Pairwise correlation analysis and multicollinearity test
Table 3 reports the findings of correlation analysis, and it also reports the results of
multicollinearity test. The V.I.F. values are less than 2 for all variables, which suggests
that there are no issues of multicollinearity. The results reveal that short-term debt
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LEV 18,677 0.492 0.196 0.123 0.902
SDEBT 18,677 0.26 0.325 0 1
GTH 18,677 1.991 1.715 0.265 9.735
SGTH 18,677 0.204 0.427 0.494 2.117
DCAP 18,677 0.463 0.378 0.005 1.678
EFTR 18,677 0.174 0.15 0.217 0.622
TA 18,677 22.142 1.321 16.52 28.509
ROA 18,677 0.044 0.046 0.111 0.152
BSIZE 18,677 8.91 1.81 3 19
CEODUA 18,677 0.213 0.409 0 1
INDBOARD 18,677 0.37 0.055 0.091 0.8
Notes. This table reports descriptive statistics. See Table 1 for variables definitions.
Source: Authors formation.
Table 3. Pairwise correlation and results of multicollinearity test.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) VIF
(1) LEV 1.00
(2) SDEBT 0.04 1.00 1.15
(3) GTH 0.38 0.08 1.00 1.47
(4) DCAP 0.35 0.23 0.20 1.00 1.16
(5) EFTR 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.05 1.00 1.05
(6) TA 0.36 0.22 0.49 0.10 0.13 1.00 1.57
(7) ROA 0.27 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.07 1.00 1.10
(8) BSIZE 0.13 0.04 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.24 0.04 1.00 1.34
(9) CEODUA 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.01 0.16 1.00 1.05
(10) INDBOARD 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.40 0.09 1.00 1.239
Notes.  shows the level of significance at 1%. See Table 1 for variables definitions.
Source: Authors formation.
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(SDEBT), growth (GTH), and debt capacity (DCAP), have positive correlations with
leverage (LEV). The results further suggest that effective tax rate (EFTR), natural log
of total assets (TA), and board size (BSIZE) also have positive correlations with lever-
age (LEV). Return on asset (ROA) and dual leadership of board (CEODUA) are found
to have a negative correlation with leverage (LEV). Further, board independence
(INDBOARD) is found to have an insignificant correlation with leverage (LEV).
4.1.3. Findings of leverage equation
Table 4 reports the results of DIFF GMM and SYS GMM for baseline leverage equa-
tion. Column (1) reports the results of DIFF GMM and column (2) reports results of
SYS GMM. To test the validity of dynamic models, Sargan test and Arrellano-Bond test
are used to analyse over-identification of instruments and serial correlation in residuals.
Sargan test’s p-value and AR(2) are above 10%, which supports the validity of the
model. The lagged value of leverage has significant and positive coefficients in both
columns, which supports the decision of choosing a dynamic model for estimation.
The coefficients of short-term debt (SDEBT) in column (1) and (2) are 0.0581
and 0.0606, and both coefficients are positively significant at 1%. This reveals that
Table 4. Findings of leverage equation.
Dependent variable¼ Leverage
(1) (2)

























Number of Stkcd 2,208 2,468
AR(1) 16.85 19.44
AR(2) 0.95 0.90
Sargan (p-value) 0.25 0.15
Notes. This table reports the findings of leverage equation. Arrellano-Bond tests are represented by AR(1) & AR(2)
for serial correlation in residuals. Sargan (p-value) refers to the p-value of Sargan test to check the over-identification
of instruments. Values of standard errors are given in parenthesis. , , and  shows the level of significance at
1%, 5%, and 10%. See Table 1 for variables definitions.
Source: Authors formation.
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short-term debt positively associated with leverage. Hence, the findings support pre-
dictions of Hypothesis 1.
The coefficients of growth (GTH) in columns (1) and (2) are 0.0081 and 0.0081,
which are positively significant at 1%, indicating that growth is positively associated
with leverage. Hence, the results are in line with Hypothesis 2.
The coefficients of debt capacity (DCAP) in columns (1) and (2) are 0.114 and
0.108, and both coefficients are positively significant at 1%, which shows that debt
capacity is positively associated with leverage. Thus, the findings are in line with
Hypothesis 3.
4.1.4. Moderating effect of short-term debt
Table 5 reports the findings of the moderating impact of short-term debt on the
relation between growth-leverage. We use growth (GTH) and interaction term
(SDEBTGTH) separately to avoid any possible interaction between the variables. We
apply both DIFF GMM and SYS GMM to attain robust estimates. We report results
Table 5. Moderating effect of short-term debt on the relationship between growth and leverage.
Dependent variable¼ Leverage
DIFF GMM SYS GMM
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
LEVt-1 0.639 0.636 0.663 0.663
(0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0186) (0.0188)
SDEBT 0.0581 0.0269 0.0606 0.0282





DCAP 0.114 0.114 0.108 0.108
(0.00843) (0.00845) (0.00805) (0.00808)
EFTR 0.00486 0.00387 0.00629 0.00519
(0.00482) (0.00482) (0.00487) (0.00488)
TA 0.0739 0.0655 0.0716 0.0631
(0.00662) (0.00669) (0.00645) (0.00648)
ROA 0.545 0.545 0.547 0.550
(0.0322) (0.0325) (0.0314) (0.0318)
BSIZE 0.000319 0.000189 0.000115 3.18e-05
(0.00124) (0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00124)
CEODUA 0.000413 0.000901 0.00184 0.00225
(0.00349) (0.00349) (0.00351) (0.00352)
INDBOARD 0.0566 0.0531 0.0504 0.0468
(0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0276) (0.0276)
Constant 0.178 0.170 0.135 0.122
(0.145) (0.147) (0.138) (0.141)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,060 12,060 14,969 14,969
Number of Stkcd 2,208 2,208 2,468 2,468
AR(1) 16.85 16.71 19.44 19.32
AR(2) 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.94
Sargan (p-value) 0.25 0.19 0.15 0.13
Notes. This table reports the result of moderating effect of short-term debt on the relationship between growth and
leverage. Arrellano-Bond tests are represented by AR(1) & AR(2) for serial correlation in residuals. Sargan (p-value)
refers to the p-value of Sargan test to check the over-identification of instruments. Values of standard errors are
given in parenthesis. , , and  shows the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. See Table 1 for variables
definitions.
Source: Authors formation.
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of DIFF GMM in columns (1) and (2), and results of SYS GMM in columns (3) to (4).
To test the validity of dynamic models, Sargan test and Arrellano-Bond test are used to
check the over-identification of instruments and serial correlation in residuals. Sargan
test’s p-value and AR (2) are above 10%, which supports the validity of the model.
Coefficients of the lagged value of leverage are positive and significant in all four col-
umns, hence support the decision of choosing GMM models for estimation.
The coefficients of short-term debt (SDEBT) in columns (1)–(4) are 0.0581, 0.0269,
0.0606, and 0.0282, respectively, which are positively significant at 1% level. The coef-
ficients of growth (GTH) in columns (1) and (3) are 0.0081 and 0.0081, which are
positively significant at 1%. The coefficients of interaction term (SDEBTGTH) in col-
umns (2) and (4) are 0.013 and 0.014, which are positively significant at 1%. The
coefficients of debt capacity (DCAP) in columns (1)–(4) are 0.114, 0.114, 0.108, and
0.108, respectively, which are positively significant at 1%. The coefficients of growth,
short-term debt, and debt capacity are in line with our main results. The coefficients
of interaction terms of short-term debt and growth (SDEBTGTH) support
Hypothesis 4.
4.1.5. Additional analysis in S.O.E.s and N.S.O.E.s
Financial constraints don’t allow firms to make a change in the debt structure (Dang,
2011). Furthermore, Cai et al. (2008) argue that the government financially supports
some big Chinese firms. Therefore, state-owned enterprises (S.O.E.s) have larger
leverage compared to others (Amin, Besim, & Haq, 2019). We are expecting that
S.O.E.s in China are probably financially supported by government bodies in case of
financial matters, so, they are less financially constrained than non-state-owned enter-
prises (N.S.O.E.s). There is the probability that firms with different characteristics
may vary in behaviour in case of financing decisions. To investigate the behaviour of
firms with different features like S.O.E.s and N.S.O.E.s, we conduct analysis separately
across difference type of firm ownership.
Table 6 reports the findings of a separate analysis for S.O.E.s and N.S.O.E.s. We
use DIFF GMM for estimation. We report results of DIFF GMM in columns (1) and
(2) for SOEs and the results of DIFF GMM in columns (3) and (4) for NSOEs. To
test the validity of dynamic models, Sargan test and Arrellano-Bond test are used in
the study to check the over-identification of instruments and serial correlation in
residuals. Sargan test’s p-value and AR(2) are above 10%, which supports the
validity of the model. The lagged value of leverage has significant and positive coeffi-
cients in both columns, hence support the decision of choosing a dynamic model
for estimation.
The coefficients of short-term debt (SDEBT) in columns (1) to (4) are 0.0409,
0.0298, 0.0708, and 0.0266, respectively, which are positively significant at 1%. The
coefficients of growth (GTH) in columns (1) and (3) are 0.00626 and 0.0104. In col-
umn (1), the coefficient of growth (GTH) is positively significant at 5%, and in col-
umn (3), it is positively significant at 1%. The coefficients of interaction terms of
short-term debt and growth (SDEBTGTH) in columns (2) and (4) are 0.00682 and
0.0161. In column (1), the coefficient of the interaction term (SDEBTGTH) is posi-
tively significant at 10%, and in column (4) it is positively significant at 1%. In
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columns (1) to (4), the coefficients of debt capacity (DCAP) are 0.0828, 0.0815, 0.156
and 0.156, respectively, which are positively significant at 1%. The results of all col-
umns are consistent with main results. This reveal that the behaviour of Chinese
firms does not vary across different type of ownership in case of financing decisions.
4.1.6. Robust test using an alternative proxy of growth
Table 7 reports the results of GMM for leverage equation with alternative proxy of
growth i.e., sales growth, we apply both DIFF GMM and SYS GMM to attain robust
estimates. Column (1) reports results of DIFF GMM and column (2) reports results
of SYS GMM. To test the validity of dynamic models, Sargan test and Arrellano-Bond
test are used to analyse the over-identification of instruments and serial correlation in
residuals. Sargan test’s p-value and AR(2) are above 10%, which supports the validity
of the model.
The coefficients of short-term debt (SDEBT) in columns (1) and (2) are 0.0581
and 0.0612, which are positively significant at 1%. The coefficients of sales growth




Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
LEVt-1 0.667 0.666 0.580 0.573
(0.0375) (0.0377) (0.0318) (0.0319)
SDEBT 0.0409 0.0298 0.0708 0.0266





DCAP 0.0828 0.0815 0.156 0.156
(0.00836) (0.00844) (0.0142) (0.0142)
EFTR 0.00575 0.00471 0.000739 0.00159
(0.00548) (0.00549) (0.00791) (0.00785)
TA 0.0760 0.0688 0.0800 0.0663
(0.00804) (0.00829) (0.00986) (0.00977)
ROA 0.596 0.596 0.490 0.495
(0.0366) (0.0371) (0.0474) (0.0476)
BSIZE 0.00113 0.00103 2.11e-05 1.54e-06
(0.00147) (0.00147) (0.00185) (0.00186)
CEODUA 0.00431 0.00418 0.00292 0.00353
(0.00468) (0.00468) (0.00453) (0.00451)
INDBOARD 0.0552 0.0513 0.0122 0.00971
(0.0338) (0.0337) (0.0394) (0.0395)
Constant 0.502 0.463 0.186 0.159
(0.180) (0.179) (0.206) (0.209)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,213 6,213 5,847 5,847
Number of Stkcd 983 983 1,334 1,334
AR(1) 10.94 10.90 12.82 12.64
AR(2) 1.18 1.13 .41 .53
Sargan (p-value) 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.29
Notes. This table reports the findings of leverage equation for S.O.E.s and N.S.O.E.s. Arrellano-Bond tests are repre-
sented by AR(1) & AR(2) for serial correlation in residuals. Sargan (p-value) refers to the p-value of Sargan test to
check the over-identification of instruments. Values of standard errors are given in parenthesis. , , and  shows
the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. See Table 1 for variables definitions.
Source: Authors formation.
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(SGTH) in columns (1) and (2) are 0.0121 and 0.0127, which are positively significant
at 1%. The coefficients of debt capacity (DCAP) in column (1) and (2) are 0.113 and
0.106, which are positively significant at 1%. The results are in line with our
main findings.
Table 8 reports the findings of the moderating impact of short-term debt on the
growth-leverage association (with an alternative proxy of growth). We apply both
DIFF GMM and SYS GMM to attain robust estimates. We report results of DIFF
GMM in columns (1) and (2), and results of SYS GMM in columns (3) and (4). To
test the validity of dynamic models, Sargan test and Arrellano-Bond test are used to
check the over-identification of instruments and serial correlation in residuals. Sargan
test’s p-value and AR(2) are above 10%, which supports the validity of model.
Consistent with prior results, the lagged value of leverage has significant and positive
coefficients in all four columns. Hence support the decision of choosing dynamic
model for estimation.
The coefficients of short-term debt (SDEBT) in columns (1) to (4) are 0.0581,
0.0518, 0.0612, and 0.0546, respectively, which are positively significant at 1%. The
coefficients of growth (SGTH) in columns (1) and (3) are 0.0121 and 0.0127, which
are positively significant at 1%. The coefficients of interaction terms (SDEBT SGTH)
Table 7. Findings of leverage equation with an alternative proxy of growth.
Dependent variable¼ Leverage
(1) (2)

























Number of Stkcd 2,208 2,468
AR(1) 16.91 19.45
AR(2) 0.53 0.46
Sargan (p-value) 0.22 0.20
Notes. This table reports the findings of Leverage equation with an alternative proxy of growth. Arrellano-Bond tests
are represented by AR(1) & AR(2) for serial correlation in residuals. Sargan (p-value) refers to the p-value of Sargan
test to check the over-identification of instruments. Values of standard errors are given in parenthesis. , , and shows the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. See Table 1 for variables definitions.
Source: Authors formation.
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in columns (2) and (4) are 0.0349 and 0.0358, which are positively significant at 1%.
The coefficients of debt capacity (DCAP) in columns (1) to (4) are 0.113, 0.113,
0.106, and 0.106, respectively, which are positively significant at 1%. The findings are
consistent with our main results.
Table 9 reports the findings of the leverage equation with an alternative proxy of
growth, i.e., sales growth (SGTH) across different types of ownership, i.e., S.O.E.s and
N.S.O.E.s. We use DIFF GMM for analysis, and report results of DIFF GMM in col-
umns (1) and (2) for S.O.E.s, and report results of DIFF GMM in columns (3) and
(4) for N.S.O.E.s. To test the validity of dynamic models, Sargan test and Arrellano-
Bond test are used in the study to check the over-identification of instruments and
serial correlation in residuals. Sargan test’s p-value and AR(2) are above 10%, which
supports the validity of the model. Consistent to prior results, the coefficients of the
lagged value of leverage are positively significant across all columns, hence support
the decision of choosing dynamic models for estimation.
Table 8. Moderating effect of short-term debt on the relationship between growth and leverage
with an alternative proxy of growth.
Dependent variable¼ Leverage
DIFF GMM SYS GMM
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
LEVt-1 0.638 0.638 0.666 0.667
(0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0183) (0.0184)
SDEBT 0.0581 0.0518 0.0612 0.0546





DCAP 0.113 0.113 0.106 0.106
(0.00838) (0.00846) (0.00799) (0.00807)
EFTR 0.00379 0.00338 0.00496 0.00457
(0.00482) (0.00480) (0.00487) (0.00486)
TA 0.0524 0.0540 0.0497 0.0512
(0.00639) (0.00644) (0.00615) (0.00621)
ROA 0.576 0.571 0.586 0.579
(0.0323) (0.0326) (0.0315) (0.0318)
BSIZE 0.000323 0.000320 0.000136 0.000118
(0.00123) (0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00124)
CEODUA 0.000741 0.000556 0.00194 0.00184
(0.00350) (0.00350) (0.00353) (0.00354)
INDBOARD 0.0531 0.0520 0.0464 0.0458
(0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0277) (0.0277)
Constant 0.0242 0.0673 0.0224 0.0157
(0.145) (0.146) (0.138) (0.140)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,060 12,060 14,969 14,969
Number of Stkcd 2,208 2,208 2,468 2,468
AR(1) 16.91 16.86 19.45 19.42
AR(2) 0.53 0.58 0.46 0.51
Sargan (p-value) 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.13
Notes. This table reports the results of moderating effect of short-term debt on the relationship between growth
and leverage with an alternative proxy of growth. Arrellano-Bond tests are represented by AR(1) & AR(2) for serial
correlation in residuals. Sargan (p-value) refers to the p-value of Sargan test to check the over-identification of
instruments. Values of standard errors are given in parenthesis. , , and  shows the level of significance at 1%,
5%, and 10%. See Table 1 for variables definitions.
Source: Authors formation.
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In columns (1) to (4), the coefficients of short-term debt (SDEBT) are 0.0424,
0.0394, 0.0700, and 0.0611, respectively, which are positively significant at 1%. In col-
umns (1) and (3), the coefficients of sales growth (SGTH) are 0.00984, and 0.0144,
respectively, which are positively significant at 1%. In columns (2) and (4), the coeffi-
cients of interaction term (SDEBTSGTH) are 0.0180, and 0.0512, respectively. In col-
umn (2), the coefficients of SDEBTSGTH is positively significant at 10%, and in
column (4), it is significant at 1%. In columns (1) to (4), the coefficients of debt cap-
acity (DCAP) are 0.0810, 0.0814, 0.156 and 0.157, respectively, which are positively
significant at 1%. The results of all columns are consistent with main findings.
4.2. Results discussion
4.2.1. Short-term debt and leverage
The results reveal that short-term debt positively associated with leverage. The find-
ings remain consistent for S.O.E.s and N.S.O.E.s and by considering alternative proxy




Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
LEVt-1 0.665 0.663 0.571 0.573
(0.0372) (0.0376) (0.0315) (0.0315)
SDEBT 0.0424 0.0394 0.0700 0.0611





DCAP 0.0810 0.0814 0.156 0.157
(0.00837) (0.00845) (0.0143) (0.0143)
EFTR 0.00476 0.00462 0.00111 0.00186
(0.00548) (0.00546) (0.00781) (0.00779)
TA 0.0604 0.0643 0.0489 0.0489
(0.00787) (0.00791) (0.00910) (0.00913)
ROA 0.619 0.606 0.532 0.535
(0.0368) (0.0370) (0.0470) (0.0475)
BSIZE 0.000922 0.001000 0.000309 0.000410
(0.00147) (0.00146) (0.00184) (0.00184)
CEODUA 0.00369 0.00405 0.00290 0.00259
(0.00467) (0.00468) (0.00452) (0.00453)
INDBOARD 0.0453 0.0477 0.0206 0.0210
(0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0393) (0.0390)
Constant 0.325 0.413 0.00386 0.000212
(0.174) (0.175) (0.204) (0.206)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,213 6,213 5,847 5,847
Number of Stkcd 983 983 1,334 1,334
AR(1) 11.00 10.92 12.78 12.75
AR(2) 0.97 1.03 0.11 0.10
Sargan (p-value) 0.42 0.44 0.39 0.37
Notes. This table reports the findings of leverage equation with an alternative proxy of growth for S.O.E.s and N.S.O.E.s.
Arrellano-Bond tests are represented by AR(1) & AR(2) for serial correlation in residuals. Sargan (p-value) refers to the
p-value of Sargan test to check the over-identification of instruments. Values of standard errors are given in paren-
thesis. , , and  shows the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. See Table 1 for variables definitions.
Source: Authors formation.
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of growth. The findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1, that is, short-term debt and
leverage are positively associated, and thereby Hypothesis 1 is accepted.
One of the possible reasons for the positive association of short-term debt and lever-
age is that Chinese firms use a large proportion of short-term debt (Jiang et al., 2017).
Short-term debt makes Chinese firms financially flexible, which allows them to increase
leverage in good state by increasing short-term debt, it also helps Chinese firms to
reduce leverage in bad state by reducing short-term debt. Our findings support the
arguments that financial flexibility makes firms capable of adjusting debt level over
time. Usually short-term debt is optimal, which helps firms to mitigate sub-optimal
investment decisions by repricing and renegotiating debt contracts (Childs et al., 2005).
4.2.2. Growth and leverage
The results suggest that growth is positively associated with leverage. The findings
remain consistent for S.O.E.s and N.S.O.E.s, and by considering alternative proxy of
growth. The results are consistent to our Hypothesis 2, that is, growth and leverage
are positively related, and thereby Hypothesis 2 is accepted.
One of the possible reasons for the positive relation of growth and leverage is that
short-term debt helps Chinese firms to make flexible financing decisions and debt
capacity help them to reduce liquidity risk. For instance, in the availability of valuable
growth opportunities, Chinese firms obtain more short-term debt, which ultimately
increase leverage, indicating a positive growth–leverage association. A positive sign of
growth indicates that short-term debt and debt capacity help firms to reduce under-
investment problems sufficiently. Our results support the arguments that short-term
debt that expires before the execution of a new investment project enable sharehold-
ers to gain full benefit from new investment projects by renegotiating and repricing
of the debt contracts, and it can eliminate firms’ incentives to deviate from value-
maximizing exercise (Myers, 1977).
4.2.3. Debt capacity and leverage
The findings suggest that debt capacity has a positive and significant association with
leverage. The findings are consistent for S.O.E.s and N.S.O.E.s and by considering
alternative proxy of growth. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 3, that is, debt
capacity positively influences leverage, and thereby Hypothesis 3 is accepted.
One of the possible reason for the positive association of debt capacity and lever-
age is that debt capacity reduce liquidity risk and enhances financial flexibility (Denis
& McKeon, 2012; Diamond, 1991, 1993). Therefore, it can help firms to easily access
the debt market, and obtain cost-effective debt. Our empirical evidence supports the
argument that debt capacity helps firms to yield stable returns and have high credit
quality, which ultimately leads them to have easy access to the credit market
(Lemmon & Zender, 2010).
4.2.4. Moderating effect of short-term debt on the relationship between growth
and leverage
The findings suggest that short-term debt strengthens the positive effect of growth on lever-
age. The results are consistent for S.O.E.s and N.S.O.E.s and by considering alternative
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proxy of growth. The results are in line with Hypothesis 4, that is, short-term debt enhan-
ces the positive impact of growth on leverage, and thereby Hypothesis 4 is accepted.
The empirical evidence supports the argument that using short-term debt help
firms in renegotiating and repricing of debt contracts (Childs et al., 2005). This, in
turn, help firms to make optimal financing decisions and issue cost-effective debt in
the availability of valuable growth opportunities. Therefore, short-term debt strength-
ens the influence of growth on leverage. Moreover, Coad and Srhoj (2019) provide
support to our empirical findings and suggest that firms with higher short-term liabil-
ities are more likely to become high growth firms.
5. Conclusion
This study investigates how short-term debt and debt capacity help firms to alleviate
underinvestment problems. Based on the agency cost theory, we develop a unified
framework that models the theoretical links among short term debt, debt capacity,
growth opportunities, and leverage.
This study provides several contributions. We investigate the short-term debt and
leverage association and find that short-term debt positively influences leverage.
Further, we investigate the moderating effect of short-term debt on the relationship
between growth and leverage. The findings suggest that short-term debt enhances the
positive impact of growth on leverage. This suggests that short-term debt makes firms
financially flexible, which allows them to increase leverage in good state by increasing
short-term debt. It also help firms to reduce leverage in bad state by reducing short-
term debt. Further, we investigate the debt capacity and leverage association. We
document that debt capacity increases leverage, which suggests that debt capacity
allows firms to easily access the credit market, thereby reduce liquidity risk
and obtain cost-effective debt in the availability of growth opportunities. We also
investigate the growth and leverage nexus and find that growth positively influen-
ces leverage.
Overall results suggest that Chinese firms make efficient financing decisions. Based
on the findings of our study, we suggest that short-term debt can assist firms to
make flexible financing decisions, and debt capacity may help them to reduce liquid-
ity risk, which allows firms to obtain cost-effective financing in the availability of
valuable growth opportunities. Therefore, positive relation of growth with leverage
suggests that short-term debt and debt capacity help firms to reduce underinvestment
problems. The findings remain consistent across different types of firms, i.e., S.O.E.s
and N.S.O.E.s, and by considering alternative proxy of growth.
The findings of the study have several policy implications. Primarily, it suggests a
policy initiative that short-term debt can help firms to make better financing deci-
sions and reduce underinvestment problems. Second, it suggests that debt capacity
encourages firms to choose short-term debt and reduce liquidity risk. Third, it sug-
gests that decrease in agency costs may not encourage firms to simultaneously choose
a higher initial debt level; since the firm’s initial debt level choice also depends on the
characteristics of the firm’s growth option.
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However, we acknowledge that there are some limitations of the study, and future
research can address those limitations. First, the study does not investigate the behav-
iour of small–medium enterprises to reduce underinvestment problems. Second, due
to the limited availability of data, the study does not examine how debt covenants
play their role to reduce debt overhang problem. Future research can address the lim-
itations of the study. First, future research can investigate the role of debt covenants
in reducing underinvestment issues. Second, future research can replicate this study
and examine whether a similar phenomenon occurs at different organizational levels
and in different contexts.
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